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2-4-304-家庭與經濟不平等
2022-10-04
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場次簡介:家庭與經濟不平等

 


主持人:  呂建德
發表人:林士豪 (國立政治大學社會學系博士生)
題目:再探社會階層與重分配政策支持關聯

摘要:晚近研究中,學者Lucy Barnes提出了中間選民說,挑戰了傳統勞工階層支持重分配的社會民主理論,她指出社會階層,與重分配偏好關聯,實為一倒U型曲線:資本家和中上階層,固然不支持高稅收重分配經濟資源,但勞工和中下階層,也會因為可以搭福利制度的便車,而不傾向大政府;只有中產階層,因容易在教育、醫療上,需爭取福利制度保障,並受惠於公共財提供,而傾向大政府。
因此,本文在社會民主與中間選民說的對話上,透過World Value Survey2010-2014期的調查,使用邏輯迴歸模型,探討納入東亞發展國家,假說是否能成立;並藉此檢視傳統的社會民主理論,是否相較中間選民理論,更能影響高稅收、重分配政策的意向?
據初步結果,社會民主理論即使在西歐北美外,仍有其作用,勞工階層對於國家建構一套能夠規避生命歷程風險的制度,仍相當支持;另外在福利國家類型上,研究表明,自由市場類型有其特殊性,以美國作參考項,可以發現該國就算相比東亞發展國家,其稅收重分配的意向仍明顯低落,這或反映該國民眾,更願意接受經濟不平等,或是說,不將解決經濟不平等,視為政府的責任。

關鍵詞:社會階層、社會民主、中間選民、福利國家


發表人:賴定佾 (Ph.D. candidate, Department of Social Welfare, National Chung Cheng University)
題目:Unequal Distribution of Resources and Digital Repression資源分配不均與數位壓制

摘要:How does resource allocation influence digital repression? As inequality implies the level of economic conflict between the rich and the poor, many studies have pointed out the role of economic inequality in shaping political outcomes, including democratic transition and regime stability. The role of economic inequality varies across political regimes. The literature points out that in democracies, higher inequality increases the demand for resource redistribution; in dictatorships, higher inequality hinders democratization and promotes conflict and revolution because the poor have more incentive to gain more by overthrowing the ruler. Thus, dictatorial elites fear elections and hinder democratization. Yet, emerging literature points out that the general public may not have a correct estimate of the actual level of inequality and its variation and their position in the income distribution. Instead, their perceived inequality influences their political attitudes and behaviors and the responses of rulers and the wealthy to those behaviors. In this paper, I argue that state leaders prolong their political rule by reducing information transparency through digital repression when resources are unequally distributed. On the one hand, digital repression prevents citizens from accessing actual information about inequality. On the other hand, citizens cannot effectively monitor resource allocation in an environment of low information transparency. As a result, political leaders have incentives to suppress information flows to avoid accountability or protest over unequal distribution of resources. Based on recent scholarly efforts on the latent variables of digital repression, digital capacity, and equal distribution of resources, this paper uses cross-sectional time-series data for 97 democracies and 75 dictatorships from 2000 to 2019. I find that digital repression increases as the equal distribution of resources decreases, even after accounting for country- and year-fixed effects and confounding factors such as oil rents, China’s foreign aid, level of democracy, regime type, and the state’s digital capacity. Second, when leaders face higher political competition, it is associated with higher digital repression. This effect is robust to alternative measures of key variables, different control variables, and different regime measures. This finding helps us to understand the connection between equal distribution and digital repression. It contributes to the literature on the role of perceived inequality in shaping citizens’ political attitudes and actions.

關鍵詞:Perceived Inequality, Equal Distribution of Resources, Digital Repression, Information Transparency


發表人:黃芳誼 (Assistant Professor, Yuan Ze University)、Chung-Yang Yeh (Associate Professor, Soochow University)
題目:Does public pension crowd out private transfer in East Asia?

摘要:Family financial support conventionally is the main resource of elderly income in East Asia countries compared to the Western countries. However, social change such as higher female labor force participation, the diversity of marriage and family structure, and the expanding pubic pension are weakening the tradition. Despite the proliferated literature focused on family-oriented welfare system, the results are still inconclusive. The paper aims to examine whether and how the increase of public programs crowded out private transfers. Also, we intents to determine the extent of crowding-out become more pronounced or mitigated from 1990 to 2020. The paper utilized the Luxemburg Income Study dataset through the comparative analysis to scrutinize the change of the proportions in the public pension and private transfers in Demark, U.S., Germany, Italy, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China. The results demonstrated the public pension benefits increase in the larger scale within South Korea, Taiwan, and Italy. And it has substituted private transfer income in Korea since 2008. In short, familialism as the dimension of welfare state arrangement is only popular in Taiwan and China.

關鍵詞:family-oriented welfare system, East Asia, public pension, private transfer, retirement benefits